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HYPERBOLE, HYPOCRISY, AND HUBRIS IN THE
AID-CORRUPTION DIALOGUE
BRUCE WINFIELD BEAN*
In this article I examine the relationship between corruption and foreign aid -
specifically, development aid intended to alleviate poverty by fostering economic
growth. More than $2.5 trillion has been expended over the past six decades on
aid of all kinds. This total includes military aid, humanitarian and disaster
relief assistance as well as development aid designed to enhance economic
growth. Despite the proud rhetoric we hear about how generously aid is provided,
there is abundant evidence from the World Bank and others that development
aid has not succeeded in producing sustainable economic growth. Indeed, we
have known for decades that such aid has been counter-productive, leading to
reduced GDP per capita in more than half of all cases.
All serious scholars agree that corruption is a pervasive, global phenomenon.
But the failure of development aid to reduce corruption has not been linked to
corruption. I focus on "grand" or "political" corruption, as it is the most
intractable. Following a review of the literature, which leads to the disappointing
conclusion that development aid has not been successful, I consider those nations
where poverty-alleviating economic growth has been recently established. A look
at these successful nations leads to additional awkward truths about our proud
assertions regarding the necessary conditions for creating self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth. I then analyze current instrumentalities available to combat
grand corruption and detail their fundamental inadequacies. The article
concludes with a description of current global efforts to make development aid
more effective by redesigning delivery mechanics.
Corruption is a global behavior which all agree is a major problem. While
corruption can and should be suppressed and deterred, it will not be eliminated. I
conclude with several policy proposals designed to make development aid more
effective and less susceptible to corruption.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the relationship between corruption and for-
eign aid. By some estimates, more than $2.5 trillion has been expended
over the past six decades on aid of all kinds. This enormous total
includes military aid, humanitarian and disaster relief aid as well as aid
intended to foster economic growth. There is incontrovertible evi-
dence that corruption is responsible for the diversion of billions of
dollars of aid from its intended purposes. In Part I, I look broadly at
corruption and aid. I focus on "grand" or "political" corruption be-
cause it is the most intractable kind and has an obvious impact on aid
intended to foster long-term economic development. Part II analyzes
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HeinOnline  -- 41 Geo. J. Int'l L. 782 2009-2010
HYPERBOLE, HYPOCRISY, AMD HUBRIS
the extensive literature on the efficacy of aid in facilitating self-
sustaining, poverty-alleviating, long-term economic growth. The result
of this review is most disappointing: aid is not an effective means of
alleviating extreme poverty. In this section, I outline the foundational
assumptions underlying foreign aid and discuss the "inconvenient
truths" associated with aid.
Part III exposes some further awkward truths about where self-
sustaining economic growth has been successfully established. Part IV
deals with the undeniable impact of grand corruption on developmen-
tal aid. I analyze the current instrumentalities available to combat
corruption and their fundamental inadequacy. Part V concludes with a
summary of the overall state of affairs for current national and interna-
tional aid programs and offers several policy proposals for making
long-term development aid more effective and less susceptible to
corruption.
Few will state that corruption is not a problem. I argue that although
corruption is a problem, it is one that will not be cured or eradicated.
Corruption can and should be suppressed and deterred; however,
corruption will not be eliminated.
II. CORRUPTION AND AID
Institutions and experts involved in the delivery of aid have strong
views on corruption and its corrosive impact:
. The World Bank has labeled corruption the "single greatest ob-
stacle to economic and social development," and views the anti-
corruption battle as "central to its poverty alleviation mission."'
. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development tells us
"corruption weakens the state's rules and institutions."2
* The International Monetary Fund has emphasized that interna-
tional aid should "ensure the rule of law, improve the efficiency
and accountability of their public sectors, and tackle corruption."
" The United Nations Development Program links corruption to
1. Jeff Everett, Dean Neu & Abu Shiraz Rahaman, Accounting and the global fight against
corruption, 32 Accr., ORGs. & Soc'Y 513, 517 (2007).
. 2. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCrION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSITION REPORT 1998: FINAN-
CIAL SECTOR IN TRANSrION 23-24 (1999).
3. International Monetary Fund [IMF], The IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Gover-
nance and Combating Corruption - A Guide, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/gov/guid/eng/
index.htm (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
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problems involving gender, the environment and cross-border invest-
ment.4
Others have contributed to the universal condemnation of corrup-
tion.
. President Obama has declared that the United States
must tackle corruption at home and abroad5 and
should be at the forefront of "an international initia-
tive to root out corruption."
* We are told that:
* Corruption is a cause of poverty.6
* Corruption caused the financial crisis of 1997-
1998 in Asia.7
. Corruption contributes to man-made disasters.8
* "Corruption slows down and diverts investment,
distorts competition, is economically inefficient,
and is unfair to poor people."9
* Corruption reduces private investment.10
. "Egregious human rights violations such as inter-
national child sex trafficking are made possible
by cultures of corruption.""
* Corruption "frustrates efforts to achieve very basic
human rights," "undermines environmental re-
form technology and clean up efforts," and "di-
rectly affects the safety of ordinary consumers."1 2
* "There is no doubt that graft afflicts the develop-
4. UNrTED NATIONs DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, MAINSTREAMING ANTI-CORRUPTION IN DEVELOP-
MENT: ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACICE NOTE (2008), http://www.pogar.org/publications/finances/
anticor/UNDP-AC-Guidance-Note-08e.pdf (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
5. THE CENTER FOR GLOBAL PROSPERITY, THE INDEX OF GLOBAL PHIlANTHROPY AND REMITANCES
9 (2009), available at http://www.hudson.org (search "Index of Global Philanthropy" and follow
first hyperlink).
6. Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT'L LAw. 717
(2005).
7. Id. at 718.
8. Id. at 721.
9. Id. at 730.
10. Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters (The World Bank Development Research
Group Macroeconomics and Growth & World Bank Institute Governance, Regulation and
Finance, Working Paper No. 2196, 1999), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intwbigovantcor/
resources/govmatrs.pdf (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
11. Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN.J. INT'L. L.
155, 156 (2009).
12. Id. at 224-25.
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ing world heavily: officials defraud developing
nations of up to $40 [billion] yearly."1 3
A. Corruption is Not a Recent Development
Corruption has been with us from "the Beginning," or at least from
the time of Eve's encounter with the serpent in the Garden of Eden.14
The Bible is unambiguously explicit: " [a]nd thou shalt take no gift."' 5
The Quran has many references to corruption:
Give, therefore, full measure and weight [in all your dealings], and
do not deprive people of what is rightfully theirs; and do not
spread corruption on earth after it has been so well ordered: [all]
this is for your own good, 'if you would but believe.'"6
13. Editorial, Dodging the Graft; Strengthen the UN Convention Against Corruption, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2009.
14. Genesis 3:1-7 (KingJames).
1 Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the
LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye
shall not eat of every tree of the garden?
2 And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of
the garden:
3 But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath
said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.
4 And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die:
5 For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be
opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.
6 And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was
pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the
fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her; and he
did eat.
7 And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were
naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.
15. Exodus23:8 (KingJames).
16. The full verse is as follows:
Al-A'raf (The Heights)
Translation:
(Asad) AND UNTO [the people of] Madyan [We sent] their brother
Shu'ayb. He said: "0 my people! Worship God alone: you have no deity other
than Him. Clear evidence of the truth has now come unto you from your
Sustainer. Give, therefore, full measure and weight [in all your dealings], and
do not deprive people of what is rightfully theirs; and do not spread
2010] 785
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Beyond these religious traditions, we have additional ancient evi-
dence that suggests the acceptance of corruption as an inescapable
verity:
Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey
(or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue,
so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat
up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue.
Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be
found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so
government servants employed in the government
work cannot be found out (while) taking money for themselves.' 7
Few would dispute the conclusion that corruption is "somewhat
universal,"' 8 "an expression of our humanity,"1" or "an ugly problem
facing every human culture throughout history."o The recognition
that corruption is a universal truth suggests that corruption cannot be
completely eradicated. Despite this, the international community for-
mally condemns corruption and has taken numerous steps to suppress
and deter corruption.
B. Defining Corruption
Can we define corruption? Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
once declared that although he could not define pornography, he
knew it when he saw it.2 1 Similarly, we lawyers and legal scholars know
corruption when we see it. This knowledge, however, arises out of
cultural norms, not rigorous legal analysis. One of the most prominent
scholars in this field, Susan Rose-Ackerman, has noted: "'Corruption' is
corruption on earth after it has been so well ordered: [all] this is for your own
good, if you would but believe." (Internal citations omitted.)
17. Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. EcON. LITERATURE
1320, 1320 (1997) (citing Kautiliya, Arthasastra (4"' Century B.C.), as interpreted by R.P. Kangle
(1979)).
18. CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS: THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL AND LEGAL DIvER-
srmv, 179-80 (Sharon Eicher ed., 2008).
19. RUPERT HODDER, How CORRUPTION AFFEcTs SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE DARK
SIDE OF POLmCAL ECONOMY 165-67 (2007).
20. Spahn, supra note 11, at 224.
21. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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a term whose meaning shifts with the speaker." 2 2 For example, the
Chinese have the deeply ingrained tradition of guanxi, whereby social
relationships are created and developed by providing gifts and favors.
Similarly, in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa there is a long tradition
of gift-giving. Although U.S. policy condemns such practices, we do
accept our own practices of business lunches and Skybox entertain-
ment for potential clients. Given the different ways corruption mani-
fests, it can be difficult to define. Nonetheless, we know it when we see
it.
For this article, I focus on corruption with respect to development
aid, which, if reduced, would make aid intended for sustainable eco-
nomic development more efficacious. Thus, the focus here is on
"grand corruption,"2 i.e., the embezzlement, theft and diversion of
funds by government officials responsible for administering aid. This
paper does not discuss "grease" or "facilitating" payments."2 4 Similarly,
patronage, nepotism, commercial bribery between private parties, and
kickbacks that do not involve political figures or state bureaucracies,
while important, are not the focus of this article.
C. What is Aid?
Foreign aid has been an American national priority since 1947 with
the announcement of the Marshall Plan, which aimed to revive Europe
in the aftermath of World War II. Although this aid was deemed
tremendously successful, it is not the type of aid we deal with today.
Europe needed to rebuild a physically destroyed capital base, but the
institutions, knowledge, national policies and cultural habits necessary
for self-sustaining economic growth had long been in place; much of
the Marshall Plan's aid was directed-whether directly or indirectly-at
businesses which had functioned well prior to their destruction during
World War II.
This is not the case in the "less developed," "underdeveloped" or
"third world" nations where aid flows today. Nineteenth century colo-
nialism rapidly disappeared after World War II. Ultimately, decoloniza-
22. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL RISEs, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS,
301 (Bjorn Lomborg, ed., 2004).
23. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Coruption and Government, 15 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 328, 331 (2008).
24. 15 U.S.C. Section 78dd-1(b) excepts from the general prohibition of foreign bribery
contained in 15 U.S.C. Section 78dd-1 (a) "any facilitating or expediting payment ... which is to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action. . . ." Such payments are
often referred to as "grease" payments and generally affect only the timing of a governmental
action to which the party is otherwise entitled.
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tion increased the number of nations in need of aid to more than a
hundred. A portion of this aid was not intended to rebuild previously
functioning, developed economies, but to alleviate poverty in societies,
which, to a large extent, had never industrialized. For more than four
decades during the Cold War, aid donated by the United States and its
NATO allies was largely structured to ensure that such nations were
loyal to the Free World and not to the Communist Bloc. Such aid was
designed to encourage political and diplomatic reliability. The USSR
and the Warsaw Pact nations provided aid to secure exactly the oppo-
site loyalty. If this aid was diverted by national leaders to personal use,
this was not seen as a reason to terminate the aid, thus risking its
primary diplomatic and political objectives.
D. What Type ofAid?
There are many forms of aid and many institutions and organizations
committed to providing aid. One way to think about aid is to categorize
it as development aid, humanitarian aid or on-going charitable aid.
* Development aid is focused on long-term economic growth in the
receiving country and is generally directed to the receiving na-
tion's government,
* Humanitarian - emergency aid is provided by foreign governments
and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), often directly to
victims of natural disasters, famine relief or other crises, and
. Charitable aid, which may be provided through the local govern-
ment or may be administered by the provider, is directed towards
on-going local issues, such as health and education programs, and
is not directly focused on long-term economic growth.
There is a broad consensus that economic growth increases the
income of the poor: "[economic] [g]rowth ... has dramatically im-
proved the absolute living standards of the poor as measured by human
development indicators and income levels."2 6 This article, therefore,
deals with development aid, which aims to alleviate poverty by increas-
ingper capita gross domestic product ("GDP"). While foreign direct
investment ("FDI") and the policies that encourage such investment
25. Private sector aid aimed at economic development, such as micro loans, is not included
here because it is not, to my knowledge, susceptible to grand corruption. Foreign direct
investment can certainly support long-term economic growth and may be a source of corrupt
payments but is not the focus of this article.
26. Ian Visquez, Official Assistance, Economic Freedom, and Policy Change: Is Foreign Aid Like
Champagne?, 18 CAToJ. 275,278 (1998).
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are often deemed crucial for economic development, FDI and humani-
tarian and charitable aid are beyond the scope of this article.
E. Assumptions Underlying Aid Programs
Having established that the goal of development aid is to reduce
poverty by fostering sustained economic growth, the question becomes
how to accomplish this in the developing world.
Transparency International ("TI") is an international NGO that has
been in the vanguard of anti-corruption efforts since the end of the
Cold War when the incentives to overlook corruption in receiving
nations subsided. TI's corruption perception indices27 reveal that
nations with the highest levels of economic development have relatively
little poverty and enjoy the lowest levels of perceived corruption. Of
equal importance, the nations that do not suffer high relative rates of
perceived corruption are, with few exceptions, liberal democracies with
competing political parties and established, honest bureaucracies.
These governments have enacted and enforced laws limiting corrup-
tion. Most of these governments decry trade protectionism and pub-
licly espouse liberal economic policies, such as free trade and the free
international movement of capital. These liberal democracies are also
the source of most development aid. In light of this, we find that many
aid-giving nations assume that developing nations could reduce pov-
erty and corruption if they, too, embraced a liberal democratic model
of governance.
III. Am INEFFECTIVENESS
A. Correlation, Causation and Confusion
Before considering the impact of grand corruption on aid, it is
essential to understand the extensive scholarly literature in economics,
sociology, political science, anthropology and law dealing with the
effectiveness of aid. These studies measure aid effectiveness by its
impact on poverty, economic development and the growth of democ-
racy in aid-receiving nations.
Studies of the results of aid over the past few decades are shocking:
scholars have found a negative relationship between development aid and
economic growth. In one recent analysis, it was found that a one percent
increase in aid as a percent of GDP decreased annual real GDP per capita
27. Transparency International, Global Cormption Report 2009: Cormption and the Private Sector,
at 395-404, available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2 0 0 9 .
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growth by 3.65 percent.28 Across the globe, aid has not brought about a
meaningful increase in GDP per capita in most cases. Most importantly,
there is no persuasive evidence that corruption in the form of diversion
or embezzlement accounts for this failure. The consequences of inter-
national aid, as indicated in the following list of conclusions from
various studies, are devastating:
* "The study of the effectiveness of international aid has generated a
fast-growing literature. Most of the articles provide a negative
answer: international aid is ineffective in fostering economic
growth." 29
* "[T]he empirical evidence on the effectiveness of foreign aid is
discouraging."30
. "Despite the steady flow of development aid to poor countries in
the last 50 years, the results have been somewhat disappointing
(citing six studies from 1986 through 2001). Even though some
countries, notably in East Asia, have managed to break out of
poverty, many of the poorest countries have actually seen their real
per capita incomes decline since the 1970s."3l
" A United Nations study of 100 countries determined that fifteen
years of economic development aid (1980-1995) had not been
terribly successful: " [i] n 70 of these countries average incomes are
less than they were in 1980 - and in 43 countries less than they
Were in 1970.",32
* A separate study has demonstrated that over a twenty-five year
period from 1971-1995, there was no positive correlation between
aid and growth. "In fact, aid as a percentage of GDP has a slightly
negative correlation with economic growth."
* As an economist from Zambia has stated, Africa's "insidious aid
culture" is an "unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disas-
* Another scholar notes that although aid increases consumption,
higher consumption does not benefit the poor. Furthermore, aid
has not had a significant impact on basic measures of human
28. Tomi Ovaska, The Failure ofDevelopmentAid, 23 CAToJ. 175, 186 (2003).
29. Simeon Djankov et al., Does Foreign Aid Help ? 26 CAToJ. 1, 11 (2006).
30. Id. at 1.
31. Ovaska, supra note 28, at 175.
32. UNITED NATIONs DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 1996, at 1 (New York, Oxford University Press 1996).
33. Vasquez, supra note 26, at 276.
34. Dambisa Moyo, Why Foreign Aid Is HurtingAfrica, WALL ST.J., Mar. 21, 2009, at W1.
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development such as infant mortality ratios or primary school
enrollment.35 Thus, although aid increases the size of government,
it has no significant impact on poverty indicators.
Others have similarly concluded that "unconstrained aid may
increase public consumption rather than investment."3 7
B. Why Does Aid Fail? Aid Dependency and the Curse of Unnatural
Resources
One study published in 2003 describes the condition of "aid depen-
dency," a condition that recipients of aid may develop.38 As the African
Development Bank confirmed in a 2008 report, aid can create depen-
dency and encourage poor economic policies.3 9 Earlier research found
that "[a] secure source of foreign aid is a little like a diamond mine or
an oil deposit. Countries with access to such largesse have a cushion
that others lack."4 0 Another study compares the well-established curse
of natural resources41 with foreign aid and suggests an analogous
"curse of unnatural resources.",4 2
Empirical research reveals a negative impact of foreign aid on both
democracy and growth, because aid is found to reduce investment and
increase government consumption. 3 One study provides evidence that
in Somalia, where there are no natural resources, a civil war was
sparked by efforts of opposition groups to control the humanitarian
food aid being received. 4 4 Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo, edu-
35. Peter Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of rEign Aid, 40 EUR. ECON. REv. 289, 322 (1996).
36. Id. at 315.
37. Jeffrey Sachs et al., Ending Africa's Poverty Trap, BROOINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Acrivrly,
1:2004, 117-240 (2004).
38. Ovaska, supra note 28, at 184.
39. John Loxley & Harry A. Sackey, Aid Effectiveness in Africa, 20 AFR. DEv. REv. 163, 173
(2008).
40. SUSAN RoSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND RE-
FORM 213-14 (Cambridge University Press 1999) (citing Mick Moore, Death Without Taxes:
Democracy, State Capacity and Aid Dependency in the Fourth World, in THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE: POLYTICS AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Mark Robinson & Gordon White eds., Oxford
University Press 1998)).
41. This explanation posits that a sudden windfall of oil, mineral or other wealth slows
economic growth.Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, NaturalResourceAbundance and Economic Growth
(Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 517, 1995).
42. Djankov, supra note 29 at 2, 5-7.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Djankov, supra note 29, at 9 (citing MICHAEL MAREN, THE ROAD To HELL: THE RAVAGING
EFFECT OF FOREIGN AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARTY (The Free Press 1997)).
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cated at Harvard and Oxford and with experience at both Goldman
Sachs and the World Bank, points out the perhaps obvious fact that
with a "constant stream .of 'free' money in the form of aid, a bad
government can retain power. [A]s long as it pays the army, it doesn't
have to take account of disgruntled citizens . . . . All the government
really needs to do is to court and cater to its foreign donors to stay in
power." 45
1. Aid and Corruption During the Cold War
Prior to 1990, the effectiveness of aid in fostering sustainable eco-
nomic growth was not always the primary concern. Instead, the Cold
War motivated both sides to use aid to cement their "alliances." Former
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of
Congo, was a long-standing "ally" of the United States during the Cold
War 4 6 and is said to have amassed between four and eight billion
dollars in personal wealth.47
2. Is All Corruption Bad?
More than thirty years ago, Nathaniel Leff studied corruption in
bureaucracies and challenged the accepted wisdom that corruption is
always bad: "[t]he foregoing discussion suggests that many of the
negative attitudes toward corruption are based upon special view points
and interests ... . Indeed, the criticism has become something of a
ritual and a symbol-laden preamble accompanying policy discussion
and statements in the underdeveloped countries. As such, it is cher-
ished for the modicum of consensus it provides to otherwise antagonis-
tic groups." 48
Hernando de Soto challenged the broad conclusion that all corrup-
tion is bad in 1989 with his intensive study of the "informal economy,"
or the black market, in Peru. 49 As a later researcher noted, de Soto did
45. Moyo, supra note 34.
46. Howard W. French, Mobutu Sese Seko, 66, Longtime Dictator of Zaire, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8,
1997, available at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/090897obit-mobutu.html.
47. Arik Hesseldahl, How Dictators Manage Their Billions, FORBES, June 22, 2000, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2000/06/22/feat.html.
48. Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption, in BuREAuCRATIc
CORRUPTION IN Sun-SAHARAN AFRICA: TOWARD A SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 325, 330
(Monday U. Ekpo ed., 1979).
49. HERNADO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD,
(Harper and Row 1989).
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not consider the informal economy as a problem where unregistered
illegal companies and industries pay no taxes and compete unfairly
with companies and industries who obey the law and pay their taxes
promptly.o Instead, he believed that legality was a privilege available
only to those with political and economic power, thus leaving the poor
with no alternative but to turn to illegal means.5 ' According to de Soto,
"[t] he names of the favored individuals or consortia change with each
new government, but the system is always the same: not only does it
concentrate the nation's wealth in a small minority but it also concedes
to that minority the ight to that wealth."5
While the debate regarding the possible utility of corruption is not at
issue here, Michael Johnston reminds us that "we cannot assume that
without corruption all would be well. A Ministry of Development,
cleansed of corruption, may still pursue poorly conceived policies or
suffer from a lack of critical resources."5 3
3. No One Claims Grand Corruption is Good
The correlation between aid and corruption has been empirically
tested: "[a] n increase in aid is associated with an increase in corruption
and vice versa in that corruption appears to be persistent . . . . The
end of the Cold War presented the opportunity for tighter standards to
be applied to foreign aid. Disappointingly, the authors of one study
found that the relationship between aid and corruption has not changed
significantly since the end of the Cold War. 5
When aid is disbursed to governments whose incentives are to
maintain bad policies so as to continue receiving aid, we can under-
stand how some conclude that aid discourages policy reform.5 6 Where
this occurs, corruption is clearly not constrained and may even be
encouraged. In fact, one study directly sought evidence suggesting that
countries were rewarded with additional aid for their efforts to combat
50. Mario Vargas Llosa, Foreword to HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD, at xi, xi-xii (1989).
51. Id. at xii.
52. Id. at xv.
53. Michael Johnston, Corruption and Democratic Consolidation 31, March 12, 1999 (revised
June 2000), http://people.colgate.edu/mjhnston/MJ%20papers%2001/Princeton.pdf.
54. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?, 92 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1126, 1135 (2002).
55. Id. at 1136.
56. Jac Heckelman & Stephen Knack, Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform 11 (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3557, 2005).
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corruption. Their findings disappoint: "l[t] here is no evidence that less
corrupt governments receive more foreign aid."5 7
As noted earlier, aid has failed to bring about a meaningful increase
in GDP per capita in almost all cases. Significantly, there is no persua-
sive evidence that corruption is the cause of this failure: " [c] orruption
neither accounts for all that is bad, nor cancels out all that is good, in
any society."" We need to deal with this reality. We must focus on
making aid more effective; reducing corruption would have some
impact on this. It is well to acknowledge, however, given the research
discussed in Part II, that only a modest improvement in the effective-
ness of aid may be expected by reducing corruption at the political or
grand level.
C. Imposing Good Policies Through Conditionality
In the wake of numerous empirical studies confirming the many
shortcomings in existing aid policies and practices, a new approach to
aid-conditionality-was crafted in the early 1990's. Conditionality
required aid-receiving nations to agree to implement specific changes
in domestic policies and practices if the aid was to be disbursed. The
rationale for the new approach was straightforward: "[i]f overseas aid
lack[ed] conditionality it [will] simply postpone painful decisions by
masking underlying problems that would produce a crisis in less
fortunate countries."" Conditionality was to work as follows: the pro-
vider of aid first secured appropriate undertakings from the receiving
nation regarding the policies, programs and uses for the aid desired by
the provider. An initial tranche of the promised aid was then made
available. The theory was that the aid receiving nation would then
comply with the agreed upon conditions before successive tranches of
the aid were released.
In practice this almost never happened. Aid recipients quickly learned
that the aid agencies are in the business of providing aid; their success
is measured by the amount of aid they disburse, not by the effectiveness
of this aid.60 As a World Bank study concluded, "[t]he conditionality
principle does not seem to work because of the lack of credibility of the
punishment."61 Even when receiving nations failed to satisfy the pre-
57. Alesina & Weder, supra note 57, at 1136.
58. Johnston, supra note 56, at 4.
59. ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 40, at 213-14.
60. Vasquez, supra note 26, at 284.
61. Djankov, supra note 29, at 24.
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conditions for aid, the second tranche was still disbursed. Despite the
conditionality, "ultimately the need to lend will overcome the need to
insure that those conditions are ... met."6 3
D. Selectivity
An early empirical study concluded that aid appeared to be effective
when provided to nations which followed policies that foster economic
growth." However, limiting aid to countries following such policies-a
method known as "selectivity"- has not proven a viable solution. The
amount of policy change sufficient for the next tranche is, by nature,
subjective. Furthermore, as mentioned above, aid agencies have an
incentive to disburse aid regardless of a nation's policies.6 5 The policy
of selectivity has hardly proved a boon: "[c]ountries following good
policies are helped by foreign assistance, but the probability that a
country adopts 'good' policies is not influenced by the amount of
foreign aid received.",6
To deny aid because the receiving nation is corrupt or incapable of
implementing projects necessary for economic growth is a major
diplomatic decision. It gives the impression that the aid provider seeks
to maintain poverty. However, providing aid under such circumstances,
rewards embezzlement, corruption and policies that do not foster
long-term economic growth. Adding to this dilemma is a more recent
empirical work, which concluded, "we no longer find that aid promotes
growth [even] in good policy environments ... [A]dding additional
data to the . . . study of aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the
effectiveness of aid and suggests that economists and policy makers
should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign aid will boost
growth in countries with good policies."6 7 In other words, even where
policies we believe should foster growth are faithfully implemented, aid
simply does not work.
Neither conditionality nor selectivity has served to make aid more
effective or reduce corruption. And yet, corruption is not discouraged
62. Vasquez, supra note 26, at 281.
63. Gustav Ranis, On Fast-Disbursing Policy-Based Loans, Background Paper prepared for the
Task Force on the United States and Multilateral Development Banks 6 (1996).
64. Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth, 90 Am. ECON. REv. 847 (2000).
65. Vasquez, supra note 26, at 284.
66. Alesina & Weder, supra note 57, at 1127 (citing Burnside & Dollar, supra note 69).
67. William Easterly et al., New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar's "Aid,
Policies, and Growth" (2000), 5-6, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9846,
2003).
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through a reduction in aid."
E. Realities of the "Aid Industry"
Aid has not always been granted with the best interests of the
receiving nation in mind. For example, the disproportionate political
influence of those involved in the domestic agriculture industry in the
United States and in Europe can hardly be overstated. Both the United
States and the European Union ("E.U.") insist upon exporting food to
aid-receiving economies, despite the fact that such countries may have
only an agricultural base. The rationale given in both the U.S. and the
E.U. is "food security." However, it is obvious that such agricultural
exports can only damage the development of a viable agricultural
sector in nations receiving such "aid." Can we even call this "aid?" We
do not call this "corruption," although its impact seems comparable.
Sugar and cotton, crops important to several African economies, are
outrageously subsidized by developed nations. The subsidies total
approximately $4 billion to U.S. and E.U. farmers.6 9 As a point of
comparison, annual U.S. aid to all of Affica totals approximately $9
billion.o Meanwhile, the E.U.'s Common Agricultural Policy provides
more than $60 billion in annual direct farm subsidies. As the Chief
Economist of the World Bank has noted, the E.U. agricultural subsidies
include $2.50 per E.U. cow per day, which is more than millions in
Sub-Saharan Africa have to live on.7
Two decades into the post-Cold War era, the policies of aid-providing
nations and institutions continue to have political motives and agendas
beyond economic growth and poverty reduction. The following are a
few examples from the economic research on aid:
"Of course, growth is not the only goal of foreign aid. Political
objectives like purchasing security or promoting democracy and
human rights have often been part of foreign assistance."
68. Alesina & Weder, supra note 57, at 1126.
69. See Gumisai Mutume, Mounting Opposition to Northern Farm Subsidies, 17 AFRucA RECOVERY
18 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll7nol/171agri4.htm for
a discussion of the hypocritical aspects of the "aid" policies of the U.S. and the E.U. with respect to
agriculture.
70. Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Has Quietly Tnpled Aid toAfiica, WAsH. Posr, Dec. 31, 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/30/AR2006123000941.html.
71. See Mutume, supra note 69.
72. Vasquez, supra note 26, at 276.
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* "Wealthy nations do not necessarily have purely unselfish motives
when helping poorer countries through financial aid."7
" "U.S. aid flows can be explained by military and strategic factors.
[For the] British and French aid goes to countries that were former
colonies, and countries where these donors have historically strong
trade relations and investment interests. OPEC aid is given to
neighboring countries and favors members of the Arab League."7 4
. "Despite the popular belief that aid is primarily motivated to assist
the poor, substantial evidence points to political, strategic and
welfare interests of donor countries as the driving force behind aid
programs."7 5
.The sheer proliferation in sources of aid-national and multilateral
programs and thousands of non-governmental organizations-gener-
ates its own set of inefficiencies and barriers to optimal aid effective-
ness.
* "Donors compete to provide funds in the international aid mar-
ket."76
. Donors compete for attractive projects which are consistent with
their unique donor country priorities. They compete for the
attention of senior government ministers, thus requiring the do-
nee country to incur high transaction costs and inefficiencies
accommodating different languages, policies, procedures and do-
nor priorities. Because there are no traditional costs associated
with receiving aid, 'the donee government has no incentive to
refuse any aid.7 7 Indeed, leaders of some aid-dependent countries
are experts at securing aid. One could speculate that their incen-
tives are to make aid as ineffective as possible, surely a form of
corruption, in order to secure further aid. This eliminates any
need to raise domestic taxes, always a difficult, unpopular move in
any society.
* Donors are competitive, fashion-driven, and influenced by their
own governments' agendas.7 In addition, the World Bank's mis-
sion is to lend! In analyzing whether and how aid could be effective
in promoting economic growth, one study describes the issues
73. Ovaska, supra note 28, at 175.
74. Boone, supra note 35, at 306.
75. Id.
76. Djankov, supra note 29, at 22.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Alan Doig & Heather Marquette, Corruption and Democratisation: the Litmus Test of
International Donor Agency Intentions?, 37 FTUREs 199-213 (2005).
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raised by a recent "proliferation of aid donor organizations," which
leads to a "very large increase in transaction costs for the recipient
governments."7 9
. "My empirical results are consistent with a model where politicians
maximize welfare of a wealthy elite ....
" The political reality of our democracy, and perhaps of liberal
democracy generally, includes the following:
* Aid agencies of all kinds have a need to disburse aid.
Even when it is clear that some proportion of such aid
will be embezzled or otherwise diverted from its in-
tended purposes, such aid is often disbursed;
* There is an "aid industry" comprised of (i) farmers
who export, (ii) Washington, D.C. consultants who
profit by securing and administering overseas aid
contracts, and. (iii) academics and consultants who
believe they know what is best for aid-receiving na-
tions and are paid to provide such advice;
* We have what Africa's own Dambisa Moyo labels
"liberal constituencies with 'altruistic' intentions to
allay,"i8 1 who do so by advocating for more aid regard-
less of its effectiveness;
* Denial of or a conscious failure to recognize that
almost all economic development in post-colonial
underdeveloped nations has occurred under political
regimes which were not liberal democracies. 2
IV. WHERE HAS AID BEEN EFEcrrIvE?
The key drivers of aid effectiveness may perhaps be discerned by
examining nations that have successfully established self-sustaining
economic growth. While economists have had little success determin-
ing the key to aid effectiveness, they have determined that corruption is
not a strong obstacle to economic development. Economic growth has
been successfully established in some nations, including the "Asian
Tiger" economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
More recently, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and China have also
79. Djankov, supra note 29, at 22.
80. Boone, supra note 35, at 322.
81. DAMBISA Moyo, DEAD Am: WHY AID Is NOT WORUNG AND How THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR
AFuCA 148 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009).
82. See, infra, Part III.
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emerged as rapidly developing economies. In these jurisdictions, the
principal goal of development aid-the alleviation of extreme poverty-
has been met or substantial progress towards that goal has been
achieved. If we consider their relative levels of corruption, we note that
although the small island jurisdictions of Singapore and Hong Kong
have been uniquely successful in overcoming high levels of corruption,
the remaining six continue to have high levels of perceived corruption
as reported in the TI Corruption Perception Index ("CPI") for 2009."3
On the TI scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the best rating, indicative of the
lowest levels of perceived corruption, South Korea and Taiwan have
CPI scores of 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. The remaining nations have
ratings below 5.0 on this scale: China (3.6), Indonesia (2.8), Malaysia
(4.5), and Thailand (3.4). Whatever we may ultimately be able to
conclude about how to make aid more effective, these results make
clear that corruption, at least as measured by TI's CPI, is not a major
obstacle to economic development.
Economists and other scholars have looked closely at the rise of the
East Asian economies despite corruption and an obvious lack of liberal
democracy. No definitive conclusions will likely ever achieve wide-
spread acceptance or consensus. Some of the findings of these scholars
are interesting, however:
. Perversely perhaps, a World Bank study reveals that development
efforts in Taiwan and South Korea accelerated when aid was cut.8 4
* Several studies have shown that growth rates in Africa have been
tragically low, in part because of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
arising out of the deep ethnic and tribal divisions and significant
linguistic heterogeneity which are artifacts of the colonial period.
In East Asia, we may have somewhat more cohesive societies than in
Africa where European powers arbitrarily set national boundaries
in the 191 century.85
* "In late 1995 ex-president Roh Tae Woo [of South Korea] admitted
that he alone had accumulated a personal fortune of around $650
million over a five year period in office. While Roh's behaviour
had ... serious political repercussions in South Korea, it was
difficult to argue that economic performance had been seriously
83. Corruption Perceptions Index Table 2009, available at http://www.transparency.org/
policy.research/surveysindices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
84. Heckelman & Knack, supra note 59, at 4.
85. William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112
Q.J. EcoN. 1203 (1997).
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undermined as a result."8 6 In countries with a clientelist patron-
client network, economic growth "is related not to the extent of
corruption but rather to the political structures which sustain
different processes through which rights are created and reallo-
cated."8 7
"By the end of President Suharto's 30-year rule in 1998, Indonesia
ranked as one of the half-dozen most corrupt economies on the
planet, according to Transparency International (TI). Yet in those
three decades, the country also experienced growth in per capita
income of 6 percent per year, a rate almost unparalleled in
recorded human history. The past 30 years have seen comparable
economic progress in China: since the 1976 death of Mao Zedong,
the Chinese economy has eclipsed even Suharto-level growth rates
despite also holding position 79 in TI's latest ranking, tied with
Burkina Faso."8 8
The "vast and inconclusive literature" on the results of more than
half a century of aid confirm a verdict of "indeterminacy" as to what
makes aid work. Whatever else may be found to be true about the
conditions that contribute to aid effectiveness, few can argue that
corruption is the reason aid has failed. Nevertheless, "[t]here is no
doubt about the overall verdict: corruption is bad for development."90
V. How is GRAND CORRUPTION TO BE ADDRESSED?
Grand corruption is undeniably associated with development aid,
but aid programs have fundamental problems apart from corruption.
The empirical research has not found that corruption is a major
impediment to the effectiveness of economic development aid. De-
cades of research into the effectiveness of such aid reveals the awkward,
86. Mushtaq Khan, The Efficiency Implications of Corruption, in DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL CON-
CEPTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, VOL. IV, STATES, POLITICS AND CIVIL SocIETy 299 (Stuart Corbridge
ed., Routledge 2000). The Roh scandal was part of a much larger scandal involving twenty-four of
the country's chaebol, including the four largest, Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and [LG]. The
chaebol involved were referred to in the Financial Times as a 'roll-call of Korean Industry.' Id at
301.
87. Id. at 313.
88. Ray Fisman, argument, The Bad Kind of Corruption, FOREIGN Pouscy, Mar. 24,2010, available
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/24/thebad-kind_ofLcorruption#comment-
151166 (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
89. William Easterly, Introduction: Can't Take It Anymore?, in REINVENTING FOREIGN AID 1, 18
(William Easterly ed., MIT Press 2008).
90. ALAN BEATTIE, FALSE EcONoMY: A SURPRISING EcoNoMIC HISTORY OF THE WoRLD 230, 226
(Riverhead Books 2009).
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inconvenient and inescapable conclusion that current programs of
administering and delivering aid do not produce sustainable economic
growth. As discussed in Part IV(C), infra, major efforts to redesign aid
programs are now underway. Reducing grand corruption remains a
worthwhile goal. Less corruption means that more funds are available
for economic development. Whether more aid is part of the solution to
its ineffectiveness is the subject of much debate.9' I next consider the
means available for addressing grand corruption in the aid context.
A. Fighting Grand Corruption: The Inadequacies of Current Statutes and
Conventions
Despite the failure of aid efforts, America can be proud of its seminal
role in initiating and leading the global fight against corruption in
private commercial activities. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA"),9 signed into law by PresidentJimmy Carter in 1977, had its
origins in Congressional reaction to President Richard Nixon and the
Watergate scandal." For more than three decades, the FCPA has
required companies to maintain accurate books and records of all
payments and accounts held or controlled by them.94 More signifi-
cantly, the FCPA makes payments to foreign government officials to
"obtain or retain business" 9 5 a federal offense.96
The FCPA was not easily received by American businesses. Its pleas
that "everyone is doing it" and "that is how business is done over there"
failed to dissuade Congress from its mission to impose a new morality
on international business. For two decades, American companies were
subject to the FCPA's restrictions on bribing foreign government
officials while their international competitors were not. Twenty years of
diplomatic shoving and pushing finally led to the adoption of the
similar, although not identical, Organization for Economic Coopera-
91. See Part IV C and the text accompanying notes 138 through 146 infra.
92. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended by
Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-03, 102
Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b) (2), 78m(b) (3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff (1994)).
93. An elaborate description of the genesis of the FCPA is found in an article by Stanley
Sporkin, Head of Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission when the FCPA was
drafted. Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning ofSchmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1998).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (A) (1994).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994).
96. Id.
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tion and Development ("OECD") Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the
"OECD Anti-Bribery Convention") in 1997." There are now thirty-
eight parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.98
The FCPA and, later, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, broke new
ground and established an entirely new approach to fighting corrup-
tion. The FCPA creates a federal criminal offense for acts which may be
done entirely outside of the United States by persons who may not be
U.S. citizens nor have ever visited the United States.99 Like the FCPA,
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires the parties thereto to
enact criminal statutes outlawing the overseas bribery of government
officials.
While the enactment of the FCPA and the successful negotiation of
this Convention created a new front in the "war against corruption,"
neither the FCPA nor the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention applies to
grand corruption where the aid funds are provided by a government or
a multilateral aid agency. The FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention criminalize only the actions of private parties and legal
entities that pay or offer to pay bribes;100 they do not apply to the
intended bribe recipient. In an important FCPA prosecution, a case
was brought against both the alleged bribe payers and the foreign
government officials who profited. In U.S. v Castle,101 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that Congress did not intend for the FCPA to reach bribe-
receiving foreign officials, either directly or as parties to a conspiracy to
violate the FCPA. Thus, the FCPA has been limited to bribe payers and
does not impact the foreign government officials accused of receiving a
97. Convention on Combating Bribery ofForeign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions, November 21, 1997, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (last
visitedJune 5, 2010).
98. The following are the thirty OECD members and eight additional parties (marked with
an asterisk) to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. The Convention entered into force on February 15, 1999.
*Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, *Brazil, *Bulgaria, Canada, *Chile, Czech Republic,
Denmark, *Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, *Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, *Slovenia, *South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
United States.
99. Press Release, Department ofJustice, Former Alcatel Executive Pleads Guilty to Participa-
tion in Payment Of $2.5 Million in Bribes to Senior Costa Rican Officials to Obtain a Mobile
Telephone Contract (June 7, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07-
crm_411.html.
100. 15. U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1994).
101. U.S. v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
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bribe. Similarly, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention targets business
bribe payers without reaching the government officials who profit from
such bribes.
B. Pushing on a String: Deterring Corruption at the Top
Following the adoption of the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, further diplomatic and political efforts led the United
Nations to adopt the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(the "UNCAC")10 2 in October 2003. The UNCAC entered into force on
December 14, 2005.103 Unlike the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, the UNCAC requires parties thereto to criminalize the
embezzlement of public funds by government officials.10 4
The UNCAC has broad reach. Unfortunately, it fails to effectively
address grand corruption in the aid context. Assuming all 143 parties
to the UNCAC enacted laws criminalizing embezzlement and diversion
of aid, there is little reason to believe that grand corruption would be
impacted given that prosecutions under such laws would have to be
initiated by these very officials. There exists no procedure for the
United States, for example, to require or force a foreign sovereign to
prosecute a senior government official, even where it was clear beyond
peradventure that he has stolen millions or even billions of dollars in
aid.
In the fall of 2007, the World Bank and the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime ("UNODC") began to address this issue by commenc-
ing an initiative to recover assets stolen by corrupt political figures. The
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative' 05 will seek to assist states to
recover funds lost through crime, corruption, and tax evasion. The
efforts to recover assets prior to the establishment of the StAR Initiative
102. Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Negotiation of a
Convention against Corruption http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/
adhoc-preparatory.html (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
103. GA. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) available at http://www.unodc.
org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
104. Id. at art. 17. Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of propery by a public official.
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the embezzlement, misappropriation or other
diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of
any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the
public official by virtue of his or her position.
105. STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INrnATIVE: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNTHES, AND AcnON
PLAN (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime & the World Bank 2007), http://siteresources.world-
bank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf.
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have been absurdly meager and outrageously lengthy. The Philippines
recovered $624 million from Swiss bank accounts established by Ferdi-
nand Marcos, but the process extended over 18 years! 0 6 Of the $3 to $5
billion believed to have been taken from Nigeria by General Sani
Abacha,' 0 7 Nigeria recovered only $505 million from Swiss banking
authorities after a five-year battle.10
The International Criminal Court does not take jurisdiction over
cases involving theft or embezzlement.109 This is true even for multi-
billion dollar crimes, which delay development, cause starvation, or
prevent construction of desperately needed development projects.
Although well beyond the scope of this article, there are efforts
underway to establish grand corruption as a universal crime or a crime
under international law."o With political will and determined leader-
ship, the international community will one day acknowledge that grand
corruption is a crime under international law and subject violators to
prosecution wherever they may be found and regardless of where the
corruption occurred.
1. Private Right of Action for Grand Corruption
Ever since justice Clark made the surprising leap in JI. Case v. Borakn
to establish a private right of action under Section 14(a) of the Securities
106. The World Bank, FAct SHEET ON STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY, http://search.worldbank.org/
all?qterm=stolen%20asset%20fact%20sheet (follow "News & Broadcast - Fact Sheet on Stolen
Asset Recovery" hyperlink).
107. See Ignasio Jimu, Managing Proceeds of Asset Recovery: The Case of Nigeria, Peru, the
Philippines and Kazakhstan 8 (Basel Inst. of Governance's Int'l Centre for Asset Recovery, Working
Paper No. 06, 2010), http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/publications/working_
papers/ManagingProdceeds of_ARFinal.pdf.
108. See id. at 6.
109. See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998), available at http://
untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm.
Article 5 Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
110. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective
Human Right: Elevating Corruption to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT'L LAw. 149 (2000).
111. SeeJ.I. Case Co. et al. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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Exchange Act, plaintiffs have sought to establish such rights in other areas.
The standards for finding such a private right of action are now set out in
Cort v. Ash.'1 2 While the FCPA has been found to support a limited
number of ancillary claims (e.g., a FCPA violation may serve as a predicate
offense in an action brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") 11 in certain circumstances),114 there is no
general right for a private party to bring a claim for a violation of the
FCPA. 1" The Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, HR 2152,
was introduced to the House of Representatives in April 2009 by Represen-
tative Ed. Perlmutter, a Democrat from Colorado.' 16 This bill had also
112. SeeCortetal. v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (2009).
114. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(violations of the FCPA accepted as predicate act under RICO), affd on other grounds, 110 S.Ct 701
(1990).
115. SeeLamb v. Philip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024,1030 (6th Cir. 1990).
116. See Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152, 111th Congress (2009).
To authorize certain private rights of action under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 for violations by foreign concerns that damage domestic businesses.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES April 28,2009
A BILL To authorize certain private rights of action under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 for violations by foreign concerns that damage domestic busi-
nesses.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009.'
SEC. 2. ACTIONS AUTHORIZED.
Section 104A of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-3) is
amended-
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
(f) Private Rights of Action Authorized-
(1) AUTHORIZED PLAINTIFFS- Any foreign concern that violates subsection (a) shall
be liable in an action brought in accordance with this subsection in any court of
competent jurisdiction to any issuer which is subject to section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, domestic concern which is subject to section 104 of this Act, or
other United States person that is damaged by the violation of subsection (a) of this
section for damages caused to such issuer, domestic concern, or other person by the
violation.
(2) PROOF OF DAMAGES- For purposes of this subsection, a plaintiff in an action
under this subsection must allege and prove that-
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been introduced in earlier sessions of Congress but has never been
reported out of committee.' 17 Were it to be enacted in its present form,
HR 2152 would apply only to private parties who could establish that
(A) the defendant foreign concern violated subsection (a); and
(B) the defendant foreign concern's violation of subsection (a)-
(i) prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for or
with any person; and
(ii) assisted the foreign concern in obtaining or retaining such
business.
(3) MEASURE OF DAMAGES-
(A) IN GENERAL- The damages which a plaintiff may obtain in an action under
this subsection may be equal to the higher of the two following amounts that are
established by the plaintiffs allegations and proof:
(i) The total amount of the contract or agreement that the defendant
gained in obtaining or retaining business by means of the viola-
tion of subsection (a).
(ii) The total amount of the contract or agreement that the plaintiff
failed to gain because of the defendant's obtaining or retaining
business by means of the violation of subsection (a).
(B) TREBLE DAMAGES- In assessing damages under subparagraph (A), the
court shall enter judgment for three times the amount determined under
clause (i) or (ii) of such subparagraph (whichever is greater), together with a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs, for any violation of subsection (a).
(4) EXCEPTION FOR ROUTINE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION- The exception in
subsection (b) shall apply to an action under this subsection.
(5) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES- The affirmative defenses in subsection (c) shall apply
to an action under this subsection.
(6) CONTRIBUTION- Every person who becomes liable io make payment under this
subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if
joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment.
(7) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS- No action shall be maintained to enforce any
liability created under this subsection unless brought within three years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within six years after such
cause of action accrued.
(8) DEFINITIONS-
(A) FOREIGN CONCERN- For purposes of this subsection, the term 'foreign
concern' means any person other than an issuer which is subject to section
30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a domestic concern which is
subject to section 104 of this Act, or another United States person.
(B) UNITED STATES PERSON- The term 'United States person' has the
meaning given such term in section 104(i) (2) of this Act.
117. H.R. 2152 has been referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, House
Committee on Judiciary, and the House Committee on Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. See Govtrack.us, H.R. 2152 Foreign Business Bribery Prohibi-
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another party violated the FCPA and that such violation damaged the
plaintiff. HR 2152 does not directly address the diversion or embezzle-
ment of aid funds by senior government officials in aid-receiving nations.
However, HR 2152 deserves support since under limited circumstances, it
could serve to deter some instances of aid-related grand corruption where
private parties subject to the FCPA are involved in the aid program.
2. Financial Privacy for Senior Government Officials
Should heads of state and other government officials be afforded
financial privacy? If the president of the United States suddenly had
$30,000,000 deposited into his or her account, citizens would certainly
like to know. Many nations have financial disclosure laws. Unfortu-
nately, these can be avoided through the use of bank accounts in
jurisdictions that have extensive "bank secrecy" laws. One effective step
toward eliminating grand corruption would be to deny secret bank
accounts to heads of state and other senior government officials.
"Private banking" for the extremely wealthy is an immensely profitable
and attractive business. In recent decades, many nations have enacted
elaborate anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing laws.' 18
And while there have been repeated violations of these laws by Ameri-
can banks, with some settlements involving penalties of hundreds of
millions of dollars,19 banks have not abandoned such business oppor-
tunities.
The world is well aware of the special place Swiss bank secrecy laws
have in the hearts of the super-wealthy. One reason for a non-resident
of Switzerland to place funds in Swiss banks is to avoid paying taxes
tion Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2152&tab=committees
(last visitedJun. 2, 2010).
118. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2009); Interna-
tional Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
119. Major banks have settled for money laundering violations which, according to publicly
available information, almost certainly had to be known to bank officials but nevertheless
continued over long periods of time. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Iran Moved Billions via U.S. Banks, N.Y.
TIMEs,Jan. 9, 2009, at B1 (reporting a $350 million settlement agreed to be Lloyds TSB Group);
John Elignon, As Reign Dwindles, Morgenthau Ponders What Comes Next, N.Y. Tims, Dec. 27, 2009, at
A 20 (reporting a $536 million settlement with Credit Suisse); Timothy L. O'Brien, Bank Settles U.S.
Inquiry Into Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005 (reporting a $38 million settlement,
including fines, paid by Bank of NewYork); Wachovia Bank, N.A. Settles Previous Disclosed Compliance
Matters, MARKET WATCH, Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/wachovia-bank-na-
settles-previously-disclosed-compliance-matters-2010-03-17?reflink= MW.news.stmp (reporting a
March 2010 $160 million settlement by Wachovia Bank, NA.).
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back home. Another reason is that Swiss bank secrecy laws create an
excellent hiding place for stolen millions or billions. 1 2 0 Over the past
few years there have been several attacks on Switzerland's rule of
absolute secrecy for holders of Swiss bank accounts.
For example, after many months of negotiation, the United States
and Switzerland arrived at an arrangement whereby the details of
thousands of Swiss bank accounts held by Americans were to be
disclosed to U.S. government authorities. 12 1 In addition, the Geneva
office of HSBC, the largest bank in Europe, reported that information
on 15,000 accounts had been stolen by an employee and made avail-
able to French tax authorities. 12 2 In Germany, authorities recently paid
more than $3.4 million for data on 1,500 accounts taken from Credit
120. General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria for just five years, is believed to have stolen
more than $3 billion, much of which was sequestered in Swiss banks. The Nigerian case involves a
different form of corruption since the grand corruption there involved theft of hundreds of
billions in oil revenues which otherwise would have been available for economic development. See
Paul I. Adujie, Swiss Banks: Demands By America & Nigeria, NIGERIAN VILLAGE SQUARE, http://
www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/paul-adujie/swiss-banks-demands-by-america-a-nigeria.
html (last visitedJune 5, 2010). Haitian dictatorJean-Claude Duvalier, who left Haiti in 1986, had
similarly hidden funds in Swiss accounts. Litigation in Switzerland seeking to return the funds
back to the Haitian government failed in January 2010. See Swiss Court Reverses Award ofDuvalier
Millions, N.Y. Tnmws, Feb. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/world/
americas/04duvalier.html. The Swiss government has apparently been seeking to "shed its image
as an investment haven for the world's dictators." See id.
121. See Sen. Carl Levin, Statement of Sen. Carl. Levin on Disclosure of Annex to the
U.S.-Swiss Settlement Agreement in the UBS Case (Nov. 17, 2009) in Government Statement,
Financial Integrity & Economic Development, http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2009/11/17/
statement-by-senator-carl-levin-on-us-swiss-annex-in-ubs-case (last visitedJune 5, 2010).
While it is good to know that 14,700 people have now disclosed previously hidden
offshore bank accounts, the U.S.-Swiss Annex disclosed today, designed to compel
disclosure of the names of U.S persons with Swiss accounts at UBS, is very disappoint-
ing. It complicates and muddies what should have been a straightforward agreement by
UBS and the Swiss Government to disclose Swiss accounts hidden from the United
States by U.S. accountholders. UBS admitted last year that it "participated in a scheme
to defraud the United States" out of tax revenue. Since then, UBS has been prohibited
by its government from simply turning over the names of the 52,000 U.S. clients
suspected of participating in that tax evasion scheme with UBS. Instead, the tortured
wording and the many limitations in this Annex shows the Swiss Government trying to
preserve as much bank secrecy as it can for the future, while pushing to conceal the
names of tens of thousands of suspected U.S. tax cheats. It is disappointing that the U.S.
government went along.
122. See Dylan Griffiths & Warren Giles, HSBC's Private Bank Reports Data Theft on 15,000 Swiss
Accounts, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jun. 3, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/201003-
11/hsbc-private-bank-suisse-says-15-)00-affected-by-data-theft.html.
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Suisse, a major Swiss bank.12 3 Announcement of the acquisition of this
data by German tax authorities has, according to press reports, led
more than 10,000 German taxpayers to voluntarily reveal their Swiss
accounts and pay back taxes and fines to avoid prosecution for tax
evasion.12 4 In 2008, Germany paid for similar data stolen from the
largest bank in Liechtenstein.
Despite strident protests from the Swiss, there is no defensible policy
reason that the Swiss, or any other sovereign, should be allowed to
protect account details or the names of account holders who deposit
stolen funds. Anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing
laws need strengthening to prevent heads of state and others from
sequestering the proceeds of bribes, embezzlement and theft.12 5 The
UNODC StAR Initiative, if successful, would be a start. Changes in U.S.
law made in March 2010 may also have a positive impact, particularly if
other nations follow with comparable legislation.126
C. Resetting the Aid Agenda
The long-standing ineffectiveness of aid is not being ignored. Recent
books have proposed new approaches, which, it is hoped, will improve
aid efficacy. Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan recently published,
The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty.12 7 William Easterly has
edited Reinventing Foreign Aide's and previously published The Elusive
123. See Edward Taylor, Credit Suisse Clients, Staff Face German Tax Probe, REUTERs, Mar. 19,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE621MK20100319.
124. See Adam Sage, Cridit Suisse Clients Accused of Tax Evasion, TIMES ONuNE, Mar. 20, 2010,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry sectors/banking-and-finance/
article7069146.ece.
125. While the FATF is the source of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist
Financing recommendations, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime is leading an effort,
the StAR Initiative, which may well be able to make progress. See supra text accompany notes
115-18.
126. Under cover of the media storm over negotiating "health reform" legislation, on March
18, 2010, President Obama signed the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment ("HIRE") Act,
H.R. 2847. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat 71
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The HIRE Act includes a Title V, which
requires foreign financial and nonfinancial institutions to withhold 30% of payments made to
such institutions by U.S. individuals unless such institutions agree to disclose the identity of such
individuals.
127. R. GLENN HUBBARD & WILuAM DuGGAN, THE AID TRAP: HARD TRUTHS ABouT ENDING
POVERTY (2009).
128. William Easterly, ed., ReinventingForeign Aid (The MIT Press 2008).
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Quest for Growth,129 in which he decries the inability of donor nations to
acknowledge the shortcomings of long-established aid policies. Hub-
bard and Duggan note the success of Muhammad Yunus, the Bang-
ladeshi Nobel laureate who created "micro lending," through which
millions have been enabled to start viable, sustainable businesses, thus
working their way out of poverty.13 0 Dambisa Moyo, the Zambian
economist, has condemned the "vicious cycle of aid" evident in Sub-
Saharan Africa both in Op-ed pieces 3 and in a book published in
2009, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and Why There Is a Better Way for
Affica.13 2 Her prescription links corruption to the failure of aid but her
solution is trade focused; she applauds the progress China has made in
increasing trade with Africa. As she has said: "If the [W] est wants to be
moralistic about Africa's lack of development, trade is the issue it ought
to address."1 33
Defying the numerous studies that suggest a negative correlation
between aid and per capita GDP, Jeffrey Sachs, former head of the
United Nations' Millennium Development Project, has produced an
extensive reportl34 outlining how the United Nations can attempt to
meet its eight Millennium Development Goals, one of which is to
eliminate severe poverty by 2014. Sachs proposes vastly increased grant
aid to Africa in another effort to achieve "The End of Poverty: Economic
Possibilities for Our Time," the title of his 2005 book.13 5 These and other
books contribute to the conversation about the effectiveness of aid.
Unfortunately, given the lack of agreement among these authors, it is
129. WILuAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROwrfl : ECONoMISTS' ADVENTURES AND
MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2002).
130. Hubbard, supra note 139, 82-84.
131. Dambisa Moyo, supra note 34.
132. Moyo, supra note 89, at 49.
Foreign aid props up corrupt governments - providing them with freely usable cash.
These corrupt governments interfere with the rule of law, the establishment of
transparent civil institutions and the protections of civil liberties, making both domestic
and foreign investment in poor countries unattractive. Greater opacity and fewer
investments reduce economic growth, which leads to fewer job opportunities and
increasing poverty levels. In response to growing poverty, donors give more aid, which
continues the downward spiral of poverty.
This is the vicious cycle of aid.
133. Id. at 119.
134. SeeJEFFREY SACHS, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL
PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at http://www.unmillennium
projecLorg/reports/fullreport.htm.
135. SeeJEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERT: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005).
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likely this conversation will merely carry on with little tangible result.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Hypocrisy
In the nearly four centuries since the highly motivated Puritans
stepped on Plymouth Rock, we have not succeeded in eliminating
corruption. Neither have we succeeded in eliminating poverty in our
own land, although we are wealthy enough that no one needs to live on
less than $2.00 per day. We are not told that the more than $2.5 trillion
in total aid allocated to the underdeveloped world has not been
particularly successful in reducing, much less eliminating, global pov-
erty. Despite innumerable studies demonstrating that long-term*eco-
nomic development aid has been counter-productive, governments
continue to allocate billions in programs that do little good in the
receiving nations and permit a few senior officials in aid-receiving
nations to enrich themselves at the expense of their own citizens.
During the Cold War, corruption by senior officials was overlooked
in our effort to secure the cooperation of nations led by truly corrupt
figures. Unfortunately, in the decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
there has been almost no meaningful progress in tightening aid
standards to reduce such corruption.1 3 ' Even today, the United States
government deals with corrupt senior officials of select nations despite
overwhelming evidence that their conspicuous wealth was not acquired
legitimately.1 3 7
Major banks in the United States and Europe, particularly Switzer-
136. Alesina & Weder, supra note 57, at 1136.
137. See lan Urbina, Taint of Corruption is No Barrier to U.S. Va, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2009, at Al.
Several times every year, Teodoro Nguema Obiang arrives at the doorstep of the United
States from his home in Equatorial Guinea, on his way to his $35 million estate in
Malibu, Calif., his fleet of luxury cars, his speedboats and privatejet. And he is always let
into the country. The nation's doors are open to Mr. Obiang, the forest and agriculture
minister of Equatorial Guinea and the son of its president, even though federal law
enforcement officials believe that "most if not all" of his wealth comes from corruption
related to the extensive oil and gas reserves discovered more than a decade and a half
ago off the coast of his tiny West African country, according to internal Justice
Department and Immigration documents.
Again, this particularly egregious bit of hypocrisy relates to a senior official who has apparently
acquired oil wealth from his nation's natural resources and did not acquire his millions diverting
aid.
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land, maintain their private banking relationships with what the OECD's
Financial Action Task Force labels "Politically Exposed Persons."13 8 An
Asian Development Bank report notes that despite (i) being caught
protecting funds stolen by senior government officials and (ii) conced-
ing liability, publicly traded banks exposed for aiding grand corruption
do not suffer in the securities markets and apparently are not easily
persuaded to stop accepting deposits from questionable parties. 1 3 9
B. Hyperbole
Notwithstanding the political rhetoric and hyperbole, we shall not
defeat, conquer, eradicate or cure corruption. Corruption is a regret-
table but normal characteristic of organized human society. Accepting
that we shall not eliminate corruption, we nevertheless should imple-
ment new policies, which could work to reduce, suppress, discourage
and deter corruption.
C. Hubris
Our prosperity, favorable ratings on the TI perceptions of corrup-
tion indices, and relative lack of poverty seem to have convinced us that
we are the economic and political role model for the world. America's
aid programs require aid-receiving nations to adopt economic and
political policies that we, as a highly developed post-industrial nation,
espouse, rather than policy packages which have been shown to be
effective in developing countries. Similarly, our focus upon instituting
liberal democratic reforms in aid-receiving countries is inconsistent
with the disturbing, yet incontrovertible, observation that where sustain-
able economic growth has successfully been established, it has been
under governments which cannot be described as liberal democratic.
138. The Financial Action Task Force defines "Politically Exposed Persons" (PEPs) as
"individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country,
for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or
military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials.
Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks
similar to those with PEPs themselves. The definition is not intended to cover middle ranking or
more junior individuals in the foregoing categories." THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (The
Financial Action Task Force ed., 2003), available at http://www.fatfagafi.org/dataoecd/42/43/
33638117.pdf.
139. See Jason Sharman, ABD/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC,
POLrIcALLY ExPosED PERSONS 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/28/
44442190.pdf.
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D. Humility
The results of development aid over recent decades have been
negative in many instances. GDP per capita has actually fallen even as
aid was delivered. After more than 60 years and $2.5 trillion in aid,
there are many nations where poverty continues or has become worse.
Given the embarrassingly poor record of aid in effecting long-term
economic growth, a great deal of humility is called for. As the academic
studies described in Part II have established, the "Inconvenient Truth"
is that long-term economic development aid has not eliminated, but
has exacerbated, extreme poverty in the undeveloped world.
So long as traditional notions of sovereignty remain the foundation
of international law and diplomatic relations, the decision to prosecute
heads of state and senior government officials who are responsible for
the theft of aid funds will remain in the hands of those very officials.
Alleviating extreme poverty remains a worthy goal for the planet. To an
indeterminate extent, this goal may be fostered by aid. While humani-
tarian and emergency aid provided by international institutions, wealthy
nations, and NGOs has been effective, if not always efficient, aid
intended to foster conditions that will promote long-term, self-
sustaining economic growth in underdeveloped nations has not been
successful. Grand corruption in the form of diversion, embezzlement
and theft of aid is one of the mechanisms responsible for a small, but
undetermined portion of the failure of this aid. Rethinking the ways aid
is administered and delivered and encouraging international coopera-
tion could reduce the absolute amount of grand corruption and
eliminate poverty. If the political will and leadership could be mus-
tered, grand corruption might be added to the short list of internation-
ally recognized crimes, which are capable of being prosecuted under
universal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, given that narrow political inter-
ests drive our democracy, I am not optimistic that poverty will be
eliminated even with another six decades of aid.
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